A major element in the creation of the European area of higher education is the adoption of a common structure of degrees, implying in several countries the reduction of the duration of the first degree to three years, which is a controversial change. Cardoso et al. (2008) have analyzed student confidence in the curricula change, quantifying its impact on students' first choices of academic programs. This paper goes two steps further. First, it concentrates on a variable that better translates total demand for an academic program, namely the total number of students who place the program among their six revealed preferences, instead of just the first option; and, second, an econometric model that better fits the data is estimated. Results confirm a positive impact of the Bologna process on the demand for programs, which varies with program size and across fields of study. Our results complement those in Cardoso et al. (2008) , as they uncover that being a program leader, i.e. the only institution in the country that restructured a given program, was associated with higher demand by prospective students, which nevertheless stemmed from their "second best" options and not from their first choices.
Introduction
The Bologna process is a far-reaching reform that aims at creating by 2010 a European higher education area, expected to foster the mobility of citizens, the employability of graduates, and the overall development of the Continent. Among the central features of the Bologna reform is a re-definition of the curricula, a student-centered learning, the definition of learning-outcomes, the development of competencies, and the implementation of a two-tier system, where a three-year shorter first cycle (Bachelor), is followed by a one year and a half or two-year second cycle (Master) (European Ministers of Education, 1999) . The two-tier system is expected to enhance flexibility, with students entering the labor market after the end of the first cycle and eventually returning to the higher education system to take the Master that better fits their interests. Jacobs and van der Ploeg (2006) discuss the potential benefits of a two-tier system, based on the experience of Anglo-Saxon countries. Whether Europe will rip the benefits of the reform under course remains to be confirmed by labor market and students' mobility data, which is not available yet.
So far, studies have analyzed the perceptions of society on the Bologna reform through survey evidence. Most noticeable, reports by the European University Association (EUA) have collected information from hundreds of European universities and have provided a broad picture of the implementation of the Bologna process. These reports conclude that the reform has followed different paces, across and within countries, and that the coexistence of the old and new systems in some countries has most likely favored the surge of controversy on its implementation among higher education institutions, students and labor markets (see, for example, Crosier, Purser and Smidt, 2007) . Controversies result, on the one hand, from different visions on the nature of the reform and, on the other hand, from insufficient transparency and information conveyed by higher education institutions (Crosier, Purser and Smidt, 2007) . For example, according to that report, only 22% of the institutions surveyed reported that most of their students will enter the labor market after finishing the first cycle. Employers' lack of information on the Bologna principles, on the one side, and the belief, among academics and parents, that the Master's level is the 'real degree' may explain the apparent reluctance of graduates to enter the labor market after concluding their first cycle of studies (Crosier, Purser and Smidt, 2007) .
In one of the few studies that analyze the Bologna process from the students' standpoint, Cardoso, Portela, Sá and Alexandre (2008) assess the impact of the Bologna process on students' demand, as measured by applicants' first choice when applying to enter university. Their findings indicate a positive impact of the reform on demand, which, however, hides variation across fields of study and program size. Namely, the Bologna impact is clearly positive for study programs in the field of education, whereas health study programs appear to face lower demand. This paper goes two steps further. First, we use an alternative proxy for demand, by computing the total demand, rather than first choices. That is, we measure demand as the total number of students that include a given program among their choices, no matter its rank.
1 Second, a different specification of the econometric model, suggested by Allison and Waterman (2002) , which better fits the type of data available, 
The implementation of the Bologna process in Portugal
Although the Bologna declaration had been the subject of discussions in academia and in professional bodies -several workshops were organized to discuss the reform 1 Note that when applying to higher education, students rank up to six pairs program/institution. Additionally, the Bologna reform occurred in the absence of an Agency of Accreditation and, therefore, without quality control mechanisms. This may have favored the implementation in 'form' rather than in 'substance', that is, reducing the number of years to finish the first cycle but keeping old curricula and learning processes. 2 Just like for other European countries, researchers will have to wait for labor market data and for the evaluation process of the recently created Accreditation Agency to evaluate how deep the reform in the Portuguese higher education system was.
As highlighted by Crosier, Purser and Smidt (2007) , a 'national understanding of reforms' is crucial for their success. It is therefore relevant to assess the behavior of students and labor market during the period of adjustment to the Bologna changes in higher education curricula. In this paper, we use information on students' choices to evaluate the support that this process has received from the Portuguese society, in particular, from the Portuguese students.
Dataset and empirical strategy
The Portuguese higher education system is a binary system, with universities and polytechnics. In principle, universities should provide academic training, whereas polytechnics are in charge of preparing students for a profession. On the supply side there are constraints imposed by a system of numerus clausus. Students rank up to 6 pairs study program/institution, from the most preferred to the 6th preference. A national competition follows, with students allocated to the available places based on their grade point average, which is a weighted average of high school and national exams grades. There are two application phases. The first one takes place in July/August. The second phase takes place in September and includes the places not filled in the first phase.
The application process is centralized, such that the Department of Higher Education (Direcção Geral do Ensino Superior ) of the MSTHE gathers information on all candidates' choice sets. These administrative data, collected for the whole applicant population and all study programs offered at public higher education institutions, have 3 The unit of analysis is a study program in a given higher education institution. The data set contains all study programs in both higher education sectors: polytechnics and universities.
Such comprehensive dataset made it possible to build a program demand variable, the variable to be explained in our model. The demand for each program at an institution is, then, quantified as the number of applicants who placed that program in that institution among their choices, no matter its rank. We call this variable hits.
In Cardoso et al. (2008) demand is proxied by candidates' first choices. We believe that hits better proxies program demand, as it contains information on all students that reveal some interest on a program, that is the total potential demand, rather than only on their favorite program. Given the context of numerus clausus in which the application process takes place, the total potential demand may be of major interest
as not all students are allocated to their best choice.
3 The data are available at http://www.acessoensinosuperior.pt.
binomial model based on the following arguments. First, given that the dependent variable is a positive integer and its distribution is skewed to the left, a count data type of model (poisson or negative binomial) is appropriate. Second, given that there are repeated observations for the demand for each program, as the data available allows for the computation of demand for four academic years and two phases each year, it is possible to account for unobserved heterogeneity by means of a fixed effect model.
Finally, the descriptive statistics and a formal statistical test reveal that the assumption of equal mean and variance is not appropriate, which suggests the use of a fixed effects binomial negative model. The present study also departures from our previous analysis by improving the model estimated. According to Allison and Waterman (2002) , the fixed effects in the context of the negative binomial do not have the same meaning that
we are used to in other contexts, as they only apply to the overdispersion parameter. In order to avoid this problem, we follow the suggestion by Allison and Waterman (2002) and we estimate, based on the pooled sample, an unconditional negative binomial model with dummy variables to account for the program/institution fixed effects.
4
In the context of this model, the total demand for higher education programs is explained based on a set of program's characteristics, similar to those used by Cardoso et al. (2008) . First of all, we consider three explanatory variables that capture the group of Bologna adopters: (i) Bologna implementer -a program at an institution, which has been restructured according to the Bologna process; (ii) Bologna leader -a Bologna implementer, who was the only institution in the country that restructured that academic program; (iii) Integrated master -a Bologna implementer that nevertheless did not shorten its duration, i.e. programs that offer a joint first and second cycle degree, thus keeping a longer duration while having restructured to comply with Bologna.
The model controls for other factors that may have had an impact on study programs' demand such as the major national admission exams (dummy variables for 4 For technical details on the choice of the model, see the Appendix.
Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology and Portuguese, which are the exams with the highest failure rate), given that a generally poor performance in the admission exam in a certain subject reduces the pool of potential applicants. Moreover, we control for the scientific field of the program (9 dummy variables), since different fields reacted differently to the implementation of the Bologna process. We also account for the phase of the application process, with a dummy variable equal to one in the second phase. Given sharp differences in the dimension of the different programs and across institutions, we also control for the size of the program (number of vacancies posted).
Interactions between the Bologna variables presented above and some control variables are included as well. of the programs, respectively. Interesting enough is that these exams, which face the lowest passing rates, are less and less required. The highest decrease goes for Math, 
The Bologna process and demand for programs
Estimation results from the negative binomial model on the total program demand, using the explanatory variables described above, are reported in Table 2 . We present the first three specifications for benchmark purposes. The first specification is our base specification. Specification 2 further allows the impact of Bologna to diverge between leader and non-leader programs. Specification 3 alternatively checks whether the impact of the Bologna process has been different for integrated masters and other programs. Finally, Specification 4 combines the previous specifications. The sign and significance of the coefficients do not vary much across specifications and therefore for interpretation purposes we will refer below to the most complete specification, Specification 4.
5
In general, programs that restructured to comply with the Bologna principles were 5 The log-likelihood for each estimation reported at the bottom of Table 2 provides evidence in favor of our option for Specification 4, since this is the estimation reporting the lowest log-likelihood in absolute value. The α parameter reveals that there is overdispersion (it relates to the presence of a higher than expected variance), which justifies the use of the negative binomial model. In our analysis we use 1323 programs of study, corresponding to 7718 observations. subject to an increase in demand, when compared to programs that did not restructure.
This effect (slowly) decreases with the size of the academic program. For example, a program posting 50 vacancies saw its demand increase by 26%.
6 The impact becomes negative for programs with more than 108 vacancies (note however that over 94% of the programs post less vacancies than this benchmark). Since the Bologna dummy variable also enters the regression interacted with the field of study, these results on the impact of Bologna on program demand refer to the baseline field, Humanities.
The results are not significantly different for programs in Law and Social Sciences, Economics and Business, Sports and Arts, Education, and Technologies; i.e., Bologna also has a positive impact on these fields of study. Agriculture, Architecture, Natural Sciences, and Health show a significantly lower impact of the Bologna process when compared to Humanities. For Architecture, the results indicate that the impact of Bologna on demand is negative. The impact of the Bologna process is different by field of study. This might result from the fact that we are dealing with different market segments, where the incentives to choose can be quite diverse. -35712.13 -35706.39 -35698.47 -35692.73 Significance levels: * : 10% * * : 5% * * * : 1%. Standard errors in parentheses: Huber-White adjusted standard errors, considering clustering of observations within each academic program for different moments in time. N is the number of observations, N-g is the number of groups institution/program, and LL stands for log-likelihood. All regressions include year controls, their interaction with field of study, and institution/program-specific dummy variables.
The positive coefficient on the Bologna leader variable indicates that, if a program was restructured at one single institution in the country, it benefited from an increase in demand over Bologna implementers in general. This additional impact with respect to Bologna implementers in general took place irrespective of the size of the Bologna leader (see the insignificant coefficient on the interaction of Bologna leader with program size). This result complements those in Cardoso et al. (2008) , when analyzing the first options, which had shown that the Bologna process had no impact on the number of first choices that bologna leaders received. The increase in demand faced by Bologna leader programs that is now uncovered therefore stems from students' 'second best' choices and not their first option.
Programs that restructured to become integrated masters were subject as well to a positive impact above the impact for Bologna implementers in general. The overall impact on integrated masters increases with the size of the program.
Finally, looking at the control variables, larger programs (posting more vacancies), as expected, are subject to larger demand. Also quite naturally, the second phase gathers a remarkably lower number of applications, since it is a residual phase. The demand for a higher education program is strongly affected by the performance of the candidates in the national admission exams, with exams on Biology, Mathematics or Physics lowering the demand for the program.
Concluding remarks
We have checked the impact on the demand for academic programs resulting from changes in the curricula currently taking place under the Bologna process. The relevance of the issue follows from the mix of enthusiasm and criticism that these changes have raised, in countries where the first degree of higher education used to last for four or five years and is now reduced to three years. Results indicate that most programs that changed their curricula to comply with the Bologna principles were subject to an increase in demand by prospective students, indicative of support for the shorter first degree. Nevertheless, their receptiveness to the curricula changes varied across fields of study and with program size. Interesting enough is the fact that the increase in demand faced by institutions that were the only ones in the country that restructured a given academic program came from 'second best' choices and not from students' first choices.
allows controlling for study program characteristics that are not observable, but are assumed constant over time. So, a possible solution would be to use the fixed effects Poisson model, to take into account for this unobserved heterogeneity across academic programs. This type of models assumes that there is no overdispersion, which is to say that the mean and the variance of the variable being modeled are identical. The descriptive statistics, however, reveal that the dependent variable presents raw overdispersion.
This indicates that the negative binomial regression model might be more appropriate for our data, since it relaxes the hypothesis of equal mean and variance. The results of formal overdispersion tests indeed show clearly that a negative binomial specification is more appropriate. The test is based on the idea that a fixed effects Poisson model can be seen as a multinomial model (see Guimarães and Lindrooth, 2007) , implying that testing for overdispersion in the multinomial model can be achieved by testing for overdispersion in the Poisson model. We then use a Pearson test for the null hypothesis of no overdispersion in the multinomial model, which is rejected at any ordinary level of significance in all the specifications reported. Allison and Waterman (2002) , however, point out that the fixed-effects negative binomial model, as defined by Hausman et al. (1984) , is not a fixed-effects model in the usual sense, because the fixed effect applies to the overdispersion parameter, rather than to the covariates. That is, that model specification solves the overdispersion problem, but does not guarantee that the program-specific effects are conditioned out of the likelihood. As such, a test for the null hypothesis of successful removal of the fixed effects is required. To our knowledge, the only test available is that proposed by Guimarães (2008) . When applied to our data, that test rejects the null hypothesis of overdispersion. Nevertheless, according to the simulations performed by Guimarães (2008) , the test is not recommended for samples with small time dimensions, as is our case. According to Guimarães (2008: 65) "with panels as large as 1000 individuals the test requires at least 20 observations per individual to adequately control for type I error."
Combining the arguments and the results we obtained, we have decided to imple-ment the strategy proposed by Allison and Waterman (2002) . This consists on the estimation on the pooled sample of an unconditional negative binomial model with dummy variables to account for the program/institution fixed effects. This is the most adequate solution to deal with unobserved heterogeneity in a count data model and at the same time take into account the difference between the variance and the mean of the distribution.
